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Abstract
We study the impact of changes in the commitment power of a principal on cooperation
among agents, in a model in which the principal and her agents are symmetrically uncertain
about the agents' innate abilities. When the principal cannot commit herself to long-term
wage contracts, two types of implicit incentives emerge. First, agents become concerned
about their perceived personal productivity. Second, agents become more reluctant to
behave cooperatively - they have an incentive to `sabotage' their colleagues. Anticipating
this risk, and in order to induce the desired level of cooperation, the principal must o®er
more collectively oriented incentive schemes. We also show that temporary workers are not
a®ected by the sabotage e®ect and that as a result, their incentives are more individually
oriented.
Key Words: Teamwork, Career concerns, Sabotage, Commitment, Collective orientation
of incentive schemes.
JEL Classi¯cation Numbers: J33, D23, M12.
1 Introduction
Many corporations aim to foster teamwork among their employees. For instance, a 1994
survey of US ¯rms found that in 64% of the responding establishments, at least half of
the core workers were involved in employee problem-solving groups, work teams, total
quality management practices, job rotation or combinations of these practices.1 At the
same time, recent surveys indicate that workers distrust the commitments made by their
management.2 However, managerial commitment for long-term relationships with their
workers is a prerequisite for the e±ciency of teamwork as found by Ichniowski, Shaw, and
Prennushi (1997).3
Our paper investigates how cooperation among agents is a®ected by managerial com-
mitment. We show that when workers anticipate that their wage contracts will be renego-
tiated, their willingness to support each other decreases. They have an increased incentive
to behave sel¯shly in order to appear more productive, and may want to sabotage their
colleagues. Such behavior may be costly for a ¯rm, which in order to reinstall cooperation,
must change its incentive schemes towards more collectively-oriented wage contracts.
The argument is brought forward in the framework of HolmstrÄom's (1999) career con-
cerns model, i.e., agents' innate abilities are neither known to themselves nor to the princi-
pal. Our model (introduced in Section 2) considers a principal who wants to induce agents
to reciprocally help each other in the ful¯llment of their individual tasks.4 The only way
the principal can induce her agents to support each other is by tying each team member's
compensation to her colleagues' performance. Thus, the wage contracts we consider consist
of a ¯xed wage, an individual incentive component, and a collective incentive component.
It is important to notice that such a contract, in addition to the risk associated with her
own unknown ability, exposes each agent to risks associated with the unknown innate abil-
ities of her teammates. In Section 3, we show that if the principal can commit herself to a
salary path, she can to some extent insulate an agent's lifetime income from the uncertainty
concerning the teammates' innate abilities.
In Section 4, we show that without commitment for salary paths, the principal's ability
1Cf. Locke, Kochan and Piore (1995).
2Cf., for instance, Robinson and Rousseau (1994).
3In the same spirit, several studies have stressed the importance of `lifetime' employment for the suc-
cessful implementation of teamwork in Japanese corporations [e.g., Brown et al. (1997)].
4This setup re°ects what organization sociologists [e.g., Wagemann (1995)] call a `hybrid work design',
i.e., an organization that combines elements of interdependent and independent work.
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to insure agents against these risks decreases. Here, two interesting implicit incentives arise
due to the fact that each agent anticipates that the second-period incentive scheme will
depend on her own and her colleagues' ¯rst-period performances. First, each agent wants to
in°uence the market's perception about her productivity, in order to cash in a reputational
bonus. These are the standard career concerns know from the literature. Second, there is
a sabotage e®ect, i.e., negative `ratchet' incentives, that manifest themselves in a decreased
willingness of each agent to help her colleagues. When an agent helps her colleagues, she
increases their reputation, without being able to capitalize on this enhanced perception.
Even worse, the enhanced reputation of colleagues may hurt the agent through changes
in the composition of her wage: Upon observing high outputs, the principal believes that
the team consists of productive agents. She thus expects to pay a large part of the salary
through the collective incentive component of the salary. Since an agent's total wage is
pinned down by her outside option, this is tantamount to a smaller ¯xed wage, and hence
makes the agent worse o®.
Put di®erently, the principal's loss of commitment for salary paths does not only induce
every agent to try to look as productive as possible in absolute terms, but also relative to
her teammates. In order to undo the career concerns and the sabotage e®ect, the principal
o®ers ¯rst-period wage contracts leading to lower-powered individual incentives, but higher-
powered collective incentives. Thus the collective orientation of the o®ered explicit incentive
scheme increases.
It is important to notice that in our model sabotage incentives do not arise because
agents are remunerated according to a relative performance evaluation which makes their
compensation contingent on their colleagues' performance. Neither are they subject to an
implicit rank tournament as in Lazear (1989), who argues that in tournaments agents may
want to destroy other people's output rather than to work hard on their own performance.
The source of the sabotage incentives in our model is rather a lack of commitment of the
principal. This observation is empirically important, since explicit relative performance
evaluations appear to be rarely used in practice, while the importance of career concerns is
indisputable. Sabotage, hence, can be a rather robust phenomenon, and as Proposition 3
shows, it should rather be expected a problem among agents who anticipate to be engaged
with the same colleagues in the future than among agents whose employment relationship is
of short-term nature. The intuition for this rather counterintuitive result is that temporary
workers do not care about their colleagues' reputation because their future wages are not
a®ected by it.
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Our analysis relates to a number of papers on moral hazard. First, in respect to an-
alyzing the determinants of cooperation between agents, our framework is closely related
to Itoh (1991, 1992). Second, our model inscribes itself in the growing literature on career
concerns based on the seminal paper by HolmstrÄom (1999).
The starting point in multi-agent analyses is that, if individual outputs are observable
and correlated, incentive contracts with one agent can be made contingent on other agents'
performance. HolmstrÄom (1982) and Mookherjee (1984) show that through such `relative
performance evaluations' (RPE), a principal can ¯lter out part of the randomness agents'
outputs are subject to. This reduces the risk they face, facilitating higher-powered incentive
schemes.
The analysis of RPE's assumes that there are no technological interactions among
agents. Itoh (1991, 1992) shows that inducing cooperation among agents and carrying
out an RPE are con°icting goals.5 As a result, the principal induces agents to cooperate
only if the correlation between the agents' assignments is low, and thus the forgone bene¯ts
from an RPE are not too important. In this paper, we employ a production structure simi-
lar to the one used by Itoh. In particular, agents have task-speci¯c cost functions, and their
individual output is observable. In our model, there are however no RPE considerations,
since agents' assignments are stochastically independent. Thus, we simply presuppose the
optimality of inducing cooperation for technological reasons. We then focus on the tension
between the desire of agents to a®ect their personal reputation and their willingness to
cooperate. This tension is triggered by individuals' career concerns ensuing from changes
in the principal's commitment power.
In HolmstrÄom's (1999) career concerns model an agent's innate abilities are not known,
but past performance allows some statistical inference. To the extent that an agent's
reputation a®ects her future remuneration, she would try to in°uence her reputation ac-
cordingly. Career concerns provide positive incentives when the agent has bargaining power
vis-µa-vis the market, as in HolmstrÄom (1999). Meyer and Vickers (1997), however, have
shown that when the agent has no bargaining power, career concerns translate themselves
into a ratchet e®ect.6 By appearing to be of high innate ability, the agent creates higher
5For instance, the principal may want to induce cooperation between agents when their cost functions
are task-speci¯c.
6Meyer, Olsen and Torsvik (1996) argue that inducing teamwork can mitigate the ratchet e®ect. This
perspective is somewhat orthogonal to ours where the ratchet e®ect itself obstructs cooperation which is
desirable for technological reasons.
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expectations with respect to her performance, and hence the principal becomes more de-
manding. The e®ect we highlight in this paper - the passive sabotage of colleagues' work -
is actually another sort of such a ratchet e®ect. High performance of an agents' colleagues
hurts the agent since it will be associated with a smaller ¯xed wage, due to the perception
that she works in a productive environment.
Finally, our paper complements Gibbons and Murphy (1992) to the extent that in both
papers explicit incentive schemes are crafted so that they counter the e®ect of implicit
incentives (either positive or negative). This property is due to the additive production
technology considered by most of the literature (including our work). Dewatripont, Je-
witt, and Tirole (1999) show that if ability and e®ort enter in a multiplicative fashion in
production, explicit and implicit incentives may become complements.7
2 The Model
There is a principal, denoted by P , and N agents, denoted by i 2 I ´ f1; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; Ng. N also
represents the size of the production unit, referred to as `team'. Individuals live for two
periods indexed by t = f1; 2g, and they do not discount the future.
2.1 Production
Aggregate output of the production unit in period t is de¯ned as Y t = §i2Iyti , i.e., we
assume a production structure in which each of the N agents has a clear task assignment
at time t.8 Agent i's output yti represents the degree to which he has ful¯lled his task,
and total output is simply the sum of individual outputs each of which are assumed to be
observable and veri¯able. Let yt ´ (yt1; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; yti ; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; ytN) denote the pro¯le of the individual
outputs of all agents. This setup, borrowed from Itoh (1991, 1992), presupposes that the
7Ortega (1999) employs the career concerns framework to analyze the allocation of power within a
¯rm. He argues that power increases visibility to the outside world, and consequently it strengthens the
importance of career concerns. It is shown that the positive incentive e®ects uneven allocation of authority
has on more powerful managers outweigh the negative incentive e®ects on those managers with less power.
8There are two interpretations for Y t. It can be considered as the output of a ¯rm that only employs
labor, for instance, a consulting or a law ¯rm. Alternatively, it may represent a ¯rm's `labor product',
which is maximized by a principal who takes her ¯rm's capital endowment as given in the short run.
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principal could deal with each agent separately. Denote individual outputs by
yti = µi + "
t
i + e
t
ii + h(N)
X
j 6=i
etji:
The ¯rst three elements stem from the standard career concerns model. First, there is the
agent's innate ability, µi, which is assumed to be a realization of a normally distributed
random variable with mean 0 and variance ¾2µ , and which is independently and identically
distributed (i.i.d.) across agents. This variable re°ects the fact that the agent's ability is
subjected to some systemic variation, symmetrically unknown to everybody. The second
element is the realization of some exogenous transitory shock, "ti » N (0; ¾2" ), each agent's
talent is subjected to. These shocks are assumed to be i.i.d. across periods and agents. We
denote by §2 ´ ¾2" + ¾2µ the variance of the random elements of the production process.
Third, the agent puts e®ort into her assignment, etii.
The fourth element h(N)
P
j 6=i etji, represents the total output e®ect of the support
(`help') an agent receives from her colleagues. Other agents' help increase agent i's output
in an additive way. We postulate the following:
Assumption 1 The marginal rate of technical substitution between an agent's own e®ort
satis¯es 1 ¸ h(N) ¸ 0 for all N ¸ 2.
We assume that providing help to others is not more productive than working on some-
one's own task, and that `help' e®ort is not value-destroying. This rather general setup
allows, through various shapes of h(N), to capture costs of teamwork that may vary ac-
cording to the technology used, the skills of team members, communication costs and so
forth.9 It should be noted, that if h(N) = 0, we are back to the standard career concerns
model of HolmstrÄom's (1999).
In carrying out their own tasks and providing help to their colleagues, agents incur
disutility which is task-speci¯c in the way speci¯ed by Assumption 2.
Assumption 2 Agent i's total cost is C(ei) =
P
j2I c(eij) =
P
j2I
e2ij
2
, where ei denotes the
vector of e®orts agent i puts into her own assignment, and those of her colleagues.
9For instance, in a team consisting of N agents, the number of communication channels is N(N¡1)
2
,
which is convex in N . Considering the function h(N) as an inverse measure of these costs, h(N) can hence
be decreasing in N and concave. Practitioners are aware of the exponential increase in coordination costs
when team size increases [e.g., Fried (1991)].
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Assumption 2 captures the bene¯ts of helping e®ort. Allocating a given total e®ort to
more than one task involves lower disutility. Since this speci¯cation is in stark contrast to
other multi-task models building on HolmstrÄom and Milgrom (1991), it may deserve some
discussion. In multi-task models, negative externalities between the tasks of a given agent
are introduced through his cost function. In formal terms, the cross derivatives of an agent's
cost function with respect to two tasks are positive. In this spirit, helping others would be
costly to an agent because it crowds out e®orts spent on his own task and thus lowers his
own output. A natural way to capture this intuition would be to assume that agents only
care for the sum of e®ort exerted, without taking into account on which task the e®ort
was spent. Costs would, for instance, take the functional form C(ei) =
³P
j2I eij
´2
=2. For
matters of further discussion, we label this speci¯cation total-e®ort-dependent cost function.
For our purposes, a task-speci¯c cost function rather than a total-e®ort-dependent one
has some advantages. First, as will become clear in the analysis of the model, the task-
speci¯c cost function allows us to focus on the sabotage e®ect induced by career concerns
that result from diminishing commitment power of the principal. The cost function we
employ facilitates us to concentrate on this novel e®ect, rather than having to deal simulta-
neously with technologically founded externalities. Second, it is noteworthy that although
the technology we consider is most favorable for cooperation, obstacles to cooperation
emerge due to reputational concerns triggered by lacking managerial commitment.
Third, it is a priori not clear, whether a total-e®ort-dependent cost function should be
deemed more natural than a task-speci¯c one. Industrial psychologists argue that there is
a taste for variety, i.e., monotonous tasks are perceived less pleasant and involve quicker
exhaustion than more variable tasks. Inducing teamwork is one way to react to a taste for
variety. Others are to redesign tasks according to the principles of `job enlargement' and
`job enrichment' which cater the same needs.10 While we believe that our task-speci¯c cost
function makes sense in the presence of a taste for variety, it has obvious limitations. For
instance, working on more than one task may involve ¯xed costs, which depending on the
production process could partially or completely outweigh the positive e®ects of a taste
for variety. These e®ects can in principle be captured by di®erent speci¯cation of h(N).
Ultimately, the decision about how to specify the cost function in a multi-task framework
appears to be an empirical, rather than a theoretical, question.11
10For a review of the literature, which emerged as a reaction to the `Taylorist' organisation of the
workplace, see, for instance, Kelly (1981).
11On this account we are only aware of one empirical paper, Drago and Garvey (1998), the evidence of
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2.2 Preferences
The risk-neutral principal maximizes output net of wages:
UP =
2X
t=1
X
i2I
[yti ¡wti ]:
Following the framework used in HolmstrÄom and Milgrom (1987, 1991), we assume that
agent i is endowed with a constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) utility function:
Ui = ¡exp
(
¡r
2X
t=1
[wti ¡ C(eti)]
)
;
where r is the CARA coe±cient. Notice that due to the multiplicative separability of the
utility function, the agent does not value income smoothing across periods, i.e., the agent
behaves as if she has access to perfect capital markets. We assume that when the agent
does not enter the labor market, she receives a payo® equal to her expected innate ability.12
Thus, given that the expected value of µi is normalized to 0, the agent's outside opportunity
is also zero.
In accordance with HolmstrÄom and Milgrom (1987), we concentrate on linear contracts.
This allows us to build on previous work, most notably on Gibbons and Murphy (1992).
Hence, agent i's salary in period t is of the following form:
wti =
X
j2I
®tijy
t
j + ³
t
i ;
where ®ij relates agent i's remuneration to agent j's output, and ³i is agent i's ¯xed
wage component. The incentive component of the remuneration can be disentangled into
an individual incentive component ®ii, and a collective incentive component ®ij, 8j 6= i.
Making use of the fact that the equilibrium is symmetric, we can denote ®ii by ®ind and
®ij by ®col; 8 i; j. Hence, agent i's wage can be expressed as:
wti = (®
t
ind ¡ ®tcol)yti + ®tcolY t + ³ti : (1)
In the ¯rst best, the principal is able to observe her agents' e®ort levels. This allows her
to o®er contracts that specify e®ort assignments. Clearly, the optimal contract insures
completely the agents, and requires the technologically e±cient levels of e®ort, i.e., efbii = 1
which does not appear to contradict our assumption of a taste for variety.
12This could be, for instance, the case if the agent's alternative is to work in the informal sector, that is
not subject to moral hazard.
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and efbij = h(N), 8 i; j 6= i.13 To provide perfect insurance, the principal chooses ®fbind =
®fbcol = 0; 8 i; j, and sets ³fbi = C(efbi ) in order to satisfy the agents' individual rationality
constraints. Given the agents' utility function, the optimal contract is the repetition of the
contract that is optimal in a static one-period framework.
3 Full Commitment to Life-Time Salary Paths
We now consider the case in which the principal can commit to life-time salary paths. For
any given N , the principal o®ers to each agent a contract that speci¯es the ¯rst and the
second-period incentive schemes, i.e., f®ti; ³tigt=1;2. Her program is as follows.
max
f®tig;f³tig
2X
t=1
X
i2I
E[(1¡ X
j2I
®tji)y
t
i ¡ ³ti ]
s:t: CEi ´
2X
t=1
[
X
j2I
®tijEy
t
j + ³
t
i ¡ C(eti)]¡
r
2
V ar(w1i + w
2
i ) ¸ 0; 8 i; (IRi)
eti argmax CEi; 8 i; t; (ICi)
where
V ar(w1i + w
2
i ) =
X
j2I
[(®1ij + ®
2
ij)
2§2 ¡ 2®1ij®2ij¾2" ]:
Notice that the de¯nition of the certainty equivalence involves a restriction on the remu-
neration contract. It speci¯es incentive schemes that depend only on the contemporaneous
outcome; i.e., the second-period wage depends only on the second-period outcome. In our
framework, this restriction is without loss of generality since utility is assumed to be mul-
tiplicatively separable across time.14 Hence, agents do not value consumption smoothing.
Moreover, since production is also separable across time, the principal cannot bene¯t by
engaging in intertemporal risk-sharing.
One should however not confuse such long-term contract with two spot contracts. By
committing herself to an expected second-period salary before she observes the ¯rst period
outcome, the principal succeeds in insulating her agents' expected life-time income from the
uncertainty they face with respect to the true ability of all team members - their expected
life-time income does not depend on any of the actual µis.
13Throughout the paper, the index `fb' stands for ¯rst best, and it is used when we want to denote
the optimal value of a variable within the ¯rst best environment. Equivalently, the indices `fc' (for full
commitment), and `rp' (for renegotiation-proof) are employed in the same fashion.
14When other utility functions were considered, such a restriction could not be imposed without loss of
generality, e.g., Harris and HolmstrÄom (1982).
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Given that the agents face the same remuneration scheme in both periods, their problem
is identical in both periods. They set their e®ort such that etii = ®
tfc
ii , and e
tfc
ij = h(N)®
t
ij;
8 i; j 6= i and t. Taking this behavior as given, the principal can solve for the optimal
incentive scheme which is given by the following expressions:
®fcind ´ ®1
fc
ind = ®
2fc
ind =
1
1 + r(§2 + ¾2µ)
; (2)
®fccol ´ ®1
fc
col = ®
2fc
col =
h(N)2
h(N)2 + r(§2 + ¾2µ)
: (3)
The ¯xed components of the remuneration, ³1
fc
and ³2
fc
, are set such that the individ-
ual rationality constraints (IRi's) are binding.15 The ¯rst-order conditions derived above
expose a variation of the classical tradeo® in moral hazard models. The principal would
want to insure her agents, but insurance involves underprovision of e®ort in respect to the
ful¯llment of the agent's own task and in respect to the help provided to others. Moreover,
the larger the parameter measuring the agent's risk aversion, r, and the variance of the
random elements of the production process, §2 + ¾2µ , the lower powered is the incentive
scheme, which again follows from the tradeo® between insurance and e®ort.
It is worth noticing that if we did not consider frictions in coordinating with other
team members, i.e., h(N ) = 1, (2) and (3) would become identical. In this case, agents
would be given the same individual and collective incentives implying that (1) collapses into
wti = ®colY
t+³ti . In this case, remuneration is a function of the total team output only - no
observation of individual performance is needed. It is the technological di®erence between
working on one's own task and helping others that makes the agents' task assignment
problem rich enough to require the principal to collect disaggregate information in the
full-commitment case.
15It should be noted that ³1
fc
and ³2
fc
are indeterminate; only their sum is pinned down by the optimal
contract. A straightforward, but interesting, implication of this feature is that the agents' right to quit
in the middle of the relationship (i.e., after the ¯rst period) is not going to a®ect the optimal incentive
scheme. The principal by setting a very low ¯rst period ¯xed salary and a very large second period's ¯xed
salary can always ensure that her workers will not ¯nd it pro¯table to quit. The principal, in other words,
due to her ability to commit, can costlessly buy out the workers' right to quit.
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4 Renegotiation-Proof Contracts
4.1 Impact of the Contractual Environment
When the principal cannot commit herself to long-term incentive schemes, the analysis is
equivalent to the one in which a new contract is o®ered every period.16 This implies that
when the second-period contract is being negotiated all involved parties have the ability to
observe ¯rst-period performances. Clearly, the second-period contract will depend on this
observation. Hence, the contracts o®ered by the principal are f®1i ; ³1i g for the ¯rst period
and f®2i (y1); ³2i (y1)g for the second.
Suppose that at the end of the ¯rst period, the output of agent i is y1i , and that
the conjectures about the ¯rst-period e®orts that contributed to this output are ce1ii andce1ji; 8 j 6= i. In a rational expectations framework like ours, these conjectures are in
equilibrium correct. Therefore, one can compute the conditional distribution of µi given
the ¯rst-period output, which is normal with mean
~µi(y
1
i ) =
¾2µ(y
1
i ¡ ce1ii ¡ h(N)Pj 6=i ce1ji)
¾2" + ¾
2
µ
;
and variance
~¾2µ =
¾2"¾
2
µ
¾2" + ¾
2
µ
:
The ¯rst impact of the changed contractual environment is that the variance of agent i's
second-period output is going to be smaller. Both the principal and the agent have more
precise predictions about the agent's ability. For further use denote the second-period
output variance by §21 ´ ~¾2µ + ¾2" .
The second impact is that now, each agent can take a report of her ¯rst-period output
(which can be thought as her CV) to other prospective employers. Given the agent's report
y1i , the principal o®ers to the agent a reputational bonus (which may be negative) equal to
~µ(y1i ).
17 Clearly, given the reputational bonus she has to o®er, the principal is indi®erent
between employing a high reputation agent at a high salary or a low reputation agent at
16For a demonstration of the equivalence, see Gibbons and Murphy (1992).
17This bargaining outcome can arise as the equilibrium of an extensive-form game in which each agent
picks randomly a prospective principal. Job applicants queue. After observing the report of the agent ¯rst
in line, the principal makes an o®er to her. The o®er is either accepted or the agent queues for another
job, while the principal makes an o®er to the next agent in line.
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a low one. Moreover, the agent knows that she cannot get a better o®er from any other
¯rm.18
4.2 Sabotage and Career Concerns
The second period of the renegotiation-proof environment is isomorphic to period 1 in the
full-commitment environment analyzed in the previous section. The incentive components
®2
rp
ind and ®
2rp
col can be derived by replacing §
2 + ¾2µ with §
2
1, in (2) and (3). The main
di®erence is that now the outside opportunity for each agent is di®erent depending on
the reputational bonus she may claim.19 Hence, the second-period individual rationality
constraint is the following:
CE2i (y
1) ´ E[w2i jy1]¡ C(e2i )¡
r
2
V ar[w2i jy1] ¸ ~µ(y1i ):
Nonetheless, because of the additive technology, the incentive component of the contract
is independent of the agent's reputation. The reasoning is that all agents, regardless of
their true ability have the same marginal product of e®ort. This implies that only the
¯xed component of the salary depends on reputation. ³2i can be computed by solving the
individual rationality constraint when binding:
³2i (y
1) = ~µ(y1i ) + C(e
2
i ) +
r
2
X
j2I
(®2
rp
ij )
2§21 ¡
X
j2I
®2
rp
ij E[y
2
j jy1j ]: (4)
When choosing her ¯rst-period e®ort levels, each agent is aware that her choice a®ects
not only her ¯rst-period income (w1i (e
1
i )), but also, the ¯xed component of her second-period
salary (³2i (e
1
i )). Di®erentiating (4) with respect to the ¯rst-period e®ort, we can ¯nd the
implicit incentives each agent considers, in addition to the standard explicit incentives given
by the principal via the ¯rst-period contract.
@³2i (y
1)
@e1ii
= (1¡ ®2rpind)
¾2µ
§2
;
@³2i (y
1)
@e1ij
= ¡®2rpcol
¾2µ
§2
; 8 j 6= i:
18Notice that other papers in the literature [e.g., HolmstrÄom (1999) and Gibbons and Murphy (1992)]
assume that the agent has all the bargaining power during the renegotiation stage. In other words, the
principal maximizes subject to a zero-pro¯t constraint. Here in contrast, due to the multiagent framework,
such formulation would be problematic. The bargaining process we envision succeeds in e®ectively making
each agent the residual claimant only to her individual output.
19As pointed out in footnote 15, the principal could costlessly buy out the workers' right to quit in the
full-commitment case, which is, obviously, not true when she cannot commit herself to future salaries.
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The ¯rst equation shows the e®ect of career concerns known from the literature. By
working more, an agent wants to increase her reputation, and hence to gain by the subse-
quent increase in her reputational bonus (
¾2µ
§2
). However, this implicit incentive is dampened
by the fact that the second-period remuneration has an `incentive component'(¡®2rpind ¾
2
µ
§2
).
Because the agent is going to be perceived as more productive, the principal expects that
the incentive component of the salary is going to be large, and hence, she increases the
salary's ¯xed component by less than the increase in the reputational bonus.
The second equation exposes an implicit ratchet e®ect that manifests itself in the form of
sabotage. When an agent helps her colleagues, their output and their reputation increase.
While this is good for her colleagues, it makes the agent worse o®. An output increase
makes the principal believe that the agent is teamed with productive colleagues. As a
result she anticipates that the collective incentive component of the salary is going to be
large, and since the total wage is determined by the agent's outside option, the principal
lowers the ¯xed part of the salary accordingly. Since the agent does not internalize her
colleagues' reputational gains, she has a negative implicit incentive to help them.
This sabotage e®ect arises even though the explicit incentive scheme actually rewards
agents for their colleagues' good performance. It is therefore, to the best of our knowledge,
novel. It should be contrasted with the sabotage e®ect noted by Lazear (1989). There,
sabotage arises because explicit incentives condition negatively the remuneration of one
agent to her colleagues' performances.
4.3 First-Period Contract
The principal's ¯rst-period pro¯t maximization problem can be represented by the following
program:
max
®1i ;³
1
i
X
i2I
E[(1¡ X
j2I
®1ji)y
1
i ¡ ³1i ]
s.t. CEi ´
X
j2I
®1jiEy
1
j + ³
1
i ¡C(e1i ) + (SPNS)¡
r
2
V ar(w1i + w
2rp
i ) ¸ 0; 8 i; (IRi)
e1i argmax CEi 8 i: (ICi)
where SPNS denotes the agent's expected second-period net surplus, which is
SPNS =
r
2
X
j2I
(®2
rp
ij )
2§21 + E(
~µi);
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and
V ar(w1i + w
2rp
i ) =
0@(A1ii)2 +X
j 6=i
(A1ij)
2
1A§2 +X
j2I
(®2
rp
ij )
2§2 + 2
0@A1ii®2rpii +X
j 6=i
A1ij®
2rp
ij
1A¾2µ ;
where A1ii = ®
1
ii + (1¡ ®2rpii ) ¾
2
µ
§2
and A1ij = ®
1
ij ¡ ®2rpij ¾
2
µ
§2
are the e®ective incentives (i.e., the
sum of the explicit and implicit incentives) the agents are in°uenced by.
This program has the following interpretation: Although the principal essentially o®ers
a one-period contract, she takes into consideration the fact that in the next period the
agent will be o®ered the contract which is optimal from the second-period's perspective.
This second-period contract gives to the agent a net surplus (net of the cost of e®ort).
Nonetheless, the principal bene¯ts by o®ering a contract to the agent that insures her
against the life-time risk she faces, while taking back in return the agent's second-period
net surplus. The agent's life-time risk is represented by the variance of her life-time income
V ar(w1i + w
2rp
i ). Proposition 1 presents the optimal ¯rst-period incentive scheme.
Proposition 1 If the principal has no commitment for long-term contracts, she o®ers a
¯rst-period incentives scheme de¯ned by the following ¯rst order conditions:
®1
rp
ind =
1
1 + r§2
¡ (1¡ ®2rpind)
¾2µ
§2
¡ r®
2rp
ind¾
2
µ
1 + r§2
; (5)
®1
rp
col =
h(N)2
h(N)2 + r§2
+ ®2
rp
col
¾2µ
§2
¡ r®
2rp
col ¾
2
µ
h(N)2 + r§2
: (6)
Comparing (5) and (6) with (2) and (3), we can track down the di®erences in the
incentive scheme o®ered here with the one under full commitment. The principal adjusts
the incentive scheme in respect to two e®ects. First, she undoes the e®ects of career
concerns on her agents' decisions. The second term in both ¯rst order conditions represents
a reduction of the power of the individual incentives and an increase of the power of the
collective incentives. Thus, the principal perfectly o®sets the implicit incentives. Second,
she adjusts the contract for the additional intertemporal risks agents bear through the
third term in both ¯rst order conditions. Without full commitment, the principal can no
longer optimally spread the intertemporal risk-sharing across both periods. This is due to
the fact that the optimal second-period contracts chosen by the principal will be ¯ne-tuned
using interim information about the agents' ¯rst-period performance. Thus the power of
the second-period incentive scheme increases, involving an increase in the agents risk from
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their ¯rst-period perspective. The principal reduces the power of the incentive scheme in
order to share part of this risk.20
In conclusion, the e®ects of implicit incentives can be perfectly undone by the renegotiation-
proof contract. However, the contract disposes nonetheless a distortion that is due to less
risk-sharing than in the full-commitment contract.21 With some algebra one can show that
®1fccol ¸ ®1rpcol and ®1fcind · ®1rpind: De¯ning ®col=®ind as the degree of the collective orientation of
the incentive scheme, we can then state the next Proposition without further proof.
Proposition 2 The renegotiation-proof ¯rst-period incentive scheme is more collectively
oriented compared to the one under full commitment.
The linear setup of our model requires that in some cases individuals `earn' large ¯xed
negative payments.22 To understand this point, consider the total variable part of the wage
bill, which is de¯ned as:
PN
i=1(w
1
i ¡ ³1i ) ´
h
®1rpind + (N ¡ 1)®1rpcol
i
Y 1. Substituing for ®1rpcol it
is easy to check that ceteris paribus it is increasing in h(N). Thus, for instance, if h(N) = 1
and r is close to zero, in the full commitment case, each worker receives close to one dollar
income for each dollar by which pro¯ts increase. Such contracts involve large negative ¯xed
wages, something we rarely see in practice. Exceptions may be franchise relationships and
cooperatives, in which individuals pay entry fees, or in former times, apprenticeships were
apprentices had to pay a fee. By the same token, for smaller h(N) and larger degrees of risk
aversion, this problem loses its bite. Actually, one can derive a threshold level of h(N) as
a function of the parameters of the model such that non-negative ¯xed wages are feasible.
4.4 Long-term versus Temporary Workers
The preceding analysis has implicitly assumed that agents di®er only with respect to their
innate ability. However, labor markets are usually segmented [cf. Doeringer and Piore
20It is actually possible that the intertemporal risk born by the agents is so large that there is a corner
solution in the agents' e®ort decision, i.e., the principal induces zero e®ort. A su±cient condition for an
interior solution is that ¾2" ¸
p
3¾2µ . This condition ensures that the principal does not learn too much
about the agent's innate ability from the ¯rst-period output, and hence that the second-period contract is
not going to be very powerful. An interesting implication of this is that no teamwork can be supported in
the ¯rst period if the principal learns `too' fast.
21To see this, consider the case of no risk aversion (i.e., if r = 0). Here the principal is able to implement
the ¯rst best e®ort levels by o®ering ®1
rp
ind = 1 and ®
1rp
col = 1 +
¾2µ
§2
. In other words, any e®ort distortions
can be exclusively ascribed to risk-sharing considerations.
22We thank the referee for bringing this point to our attention.
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(1971)]. There are employees who participate in a ¯rm's internal labor market and see
their employment in this ¯rm as life-time career, as well as those who mainly participate
in the external labor market and whose tenure in ¯rms tends to be short. To what extent
does tenure a®ect the sabotage incentive?
Consider that the principal hires her agents on a temporary basis. That is, the agents
know that in the second period they will be members of another team in another ¯rm. This
change does not a®ect the analysis of the agents' incentives to provide their own e®ort. A
good reputation a®ects the reputational bonus they will be able to secure, no matter in
which ¯rm they will end up being employed. Put di®erently, ®1
temp
ind = ®
1rp
ind.
Agents' incentives to help their colleagues are, however, a®ected. Given that the ¯rst-
period colleagues are not going to be the same with the second-period ones, an agent
does not have to take any implicit incentives under consideration. She does not even know
tomorrow's colleagues, let alone in°uencing their reputations. This means that the sabotage
e®ect disappears in the case of temporary workers, and the collective ¯rst-period explicit
incentive o®ered to temporary workers is de¯ned as:
®1
temp
col =
h(N)2
h(N )2 + r§2
:
Comparing this expression to the collective incentives given to a long-term worker (®1
rp
col ),
we see that the last two terms of the long-term worker incentives are missing. Thus, as
already explained, there is no sabotage e®ect to take into consideration, and moreover,
the temporary worker does not bear any intertemporal risk with respect to her colleagues'
human capital (i.e., she draws a new set of colleagues every period). We can thus state the
following proposition without further proof.
Proposition 3 The incentive scheme given to temporary workers is more individually ori-
ented than the one given to long-term workers.
Proposition 3 suggests that by reshu²ing teams after one period, the principal could
undo the distortions due to the unknown abilities of teammates. However, it may not
be possible to do so for technological reasons. Indeed, if agents incur costs in getting
acquainted with each other - even very small ones - a reshu²ing will not be renegotiation-
proof. Thus, while in a full-commitment environment reshu²ing is not needed, it is not
possible in a non-commitment environment.
15
5 Concluding Remarks
This paper shows that the presence of implicit incentives makes the agents more reluctant
to behave cooperatively. The risk of sabotage forces the principal to o®er more collectively
oriented incentive schemes compared to a situation in which the principal has the ability
to commit herself to salary paths. These results are in line with a survey among Fortune
1000 ¯rms, carried out by Lawler et al. (1995). They ¯nd that ¯rms increasingly seek to
base their employees' wages on team e®orts and outputs.23 Particularly interesting is that
managers of downsizing ¯rms, who can be assumed to have particularly low commitment
power vis-µa-vis their employees, are more likely to rely on work-group or team incentives
than their colleagues in growing ¯rms.
Moreover, we ¯nd the surprising result that it may be harder to induce cooperation
among workers in internal labor markets than among temporary workers. In addition to
the results presented here, Auriol, Friebel and Pechlivanos (1999) also discusses the issue
of the optimal team size. There, we show that team size is constrained due to agents' risk
considerations - a variation of the tradeo® between insurance and e±ciency. Moreover,
teams in environments where managers have less commitment are smaller than teams the
managers of which are able to make long-term commitments.
Our model highlights that in the absence of commitment for long-term wage contracts,
there are important constraints on the restructuring of ¯rms towards more `empowerment'
and teamwork even if the individual can be made accountable for his or her performance.
It also sheds some light on the risks associated with policies that aim at developing the
individual's skills and increase his or her visibility as a substitute for job security for junior
workers.24 Unless they are accompanied by higher-powered team-oriented incentives, such
e®orts to increase `employability' may have a serious drawback in exacerbating the tendency
for sel¯sh behavior within the ¯rm. This corroborates Ichniowski, Shaw, and Prennushi
(1997) ¯ndings about complementarities in Human Resource Practices.
The model suggests that exogenous factors have an important impact on the e±cacy
of human resource practices. Notice that the environment we consider is one in which tur-
bulences are not even very dramatic: in particular, workers do not face income risks when
23While in 1987, only 7% of the respondents employed gain-sharing plans as an incentive device covering
at least 20% of their workforce, this number rose to 16% in 1993. Moreover, in 1993 close to a third of the
respondents utilized team-based incentive schemes for at least a ¯fth of their workers and employees.
24Cf., for instance, Kanter (1992).
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¯red. Nevertheless, the fact of diminishing commitment a®ects the workplace substantially,
and the ¯rm has to intensify its e®orts to induce workers' cooperation. Clearly, considering
more severe risks than the loss of wage security may enforce our predictions. Extreme
examples of the e®ect non-commitment has on employees' behavior can be traced in stud-
ies that relate organizational changes, such as downsizing or restructuring, to increased
aggression among employees [e.g., Brockner et al (1992)].
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